COLUMNS
Mistakes and Opportunity
By Senator John Sununu
In January, President Bush presented a new strategy for America’s
mission in Iraq. In the words of the Iraq Study Group, led by former
Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton,
“a new way forward.”
Too much discussion, however, has focused on the proposal for a
temporary increase in troop levels. The more important question
is whether or not the current situation can be improved at any troop
level. If the answer is no, then we should withdraw support immediately;
if we can do better, then the time to act is now.
The Iraqi people and the world are better off today with Saddam
Hussein removed from power and executed for his crimes of ethnic
genocide. More important, opportunity still exists for the United
States to bring home our troops while leaving behind an independent,
constructive partner in the region that can take full advantage
of newfound political and economic freedom for its people.
A revised approach in two critical areas should be undertaken immediately
- in fact it is long overdue. First, the burden of responsibility
must shift to the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
They must take immediate steps to aggressively deploy Iraqi forces
to halt sectarian violence; they must pass new laws to share oil
revenues equitably among different ethnic groups and regions; they
must hold local elections that give Sunnis a greater voice in government;
and they must pursue a strong and formal process of national reconciliation.
Second, we need to revise our military tactics to give our commanders
more flexibility, and bring more Iraqi forces to the forefront of
this struggle. These changes include new rules of engagement for
U.S. personnel, greater use of embedded American forces within Iraqi
brigades, and the transfer of all responsibility for security in
outlying provinces to Iraqi forces. These were among the key recommendations
of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group – recommendations that I endorsed
when they were first released. Without such fundamental changes
in the political and economic environment, improvements in the security
situation will never be sustained.
These changes in tactics make sense, but they can be implemented
without a significant increase in U.S. troop presence. If they are
shown to be effective, our new commanders in Iraq can then make
the case for expanding their implementation. Congress and the American
people want them to succeed and will respond accordingly. Equally
important, the United States should not commit to a sustained increase
in troop strength until the Iraqi government has delivered on key
promises. Negotiations in many of these areas have been ongoing
for months, but if the government does not act on oil distribution,
troop deployment, and national reconciliation, in the coming weeks
I doubt they ever will.
The Iraq Study Group Report concluded that, “By the first quarter
of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation
on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection
could be out of Iraq.” I agree with this assessment, but it requires
that we push the Iraqi government to resolve underlying political
and economic questions, improve the fitness of Iraqi security forces,
and take action against sectarian violence in the days ahead.
We made significant mistakes after Saddam Hussein’s fall in April
of 2003: Looting was allowed to take place unchecked in many places;
the “de-Baathification” process unnecessarily pulled thousands of
capable Iraqi professionals from government, education, and military
positions; and efforts to deliver reliable electricity service in
Baghdad failed miserably.
These facts make a revision in strategy both essential and overdue.
We must continue to fully fund and support all of our military personnel
stationed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world, but ours is
not an open-ended commitment. The burden now rests squarely on the
shoulders of the Iraqi government.
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